Summary. -North-South relations have been characterized by three ideological phases. The first started with a long period of ideological harmony, lasting into the early 1970s. It was interrupted by OPEC and the period of radical Southern ferment, to be followed by another, opposed divide when the United States shifted into conservative ideological posturing and actions with the first Reagan Administration.
I. INTRODUCTION 2. HEGEMONY AND CONSENSUS
Most economists seek to retreat into a "value free" neutrality.
Such neutrality is a dream or a nightmare, depending on your preferences; but in either case it remains a figment of one's imagination.
Relations in the economic sphere, between the developing and the developed countries, evolved with substantial if diminishing tranquility until the early 1970s.
I propose to argue rather frontally instead that ideological perceptions, attitudes and preferences have defined the context in which important issues of political economy, affecting economic relations among the developing and the developed countries, have been debated and, in some critical areas, even decided upon. In particular, a long period of relative ideological harmony, lasting almost into the early 197Os, has been disturbed by two dramatic and altogether opposed ideological divides. One resulted in the period of radical Southern ferment, in the aftermath of the OPEC successes in 1971 and 1973. The other followed thereafter, originating in the election of President Reagan in 1979 and defined by his Administration's policies in the first term which ushered in militant conservative activism, not merely at home but also in foreign economic policy.
The ideology that provided the rationale and the cement during this postwar period was not universally shared, of course, by all actors in the international economy. But this was definitely a period of substantial hegemonic consensus around what we now call the Liberal International Economic Order (LIEO). International governance was provided by the Bretton Woods multilateral institutions which reflected the virtues of freer trade via the GATT, promoted capital flows to the developing countries via the World Bank and sought to provide the internal macroeconomic stability and external balance on which prosperity could be built, from the resulting trade and freed private capital flows and investments, via the IMF.
Since the United States is a force majeure and despite all caveats the central actor on this scene, and since I believe that the recent shift in Southern postures towards moderation is endangered by our ideological posturing and actions which have replaced theirs, I will also underline the folly of our ways through President Reagan's first term. I will also take the opportunity to put into similar ideological perspective the recent actions of the Reagan Administration in its second term.
This consensus did, however, permit several accommodations that suited evolving changes in the structure of the world economy and in the number of countries emerging from colonial status into independence.
But these changes did not constitute a fundamental change in the central thrust of the system. *This is the text of the Bernard Fain Lecture delivered at Brown University on 1X April 1985. It has been revised and updated with the insertion of Section 4 in view of the important developments in US policy. popularly described as the "Baker Plan," which occurred after the Lecture was delivered. and UNKEMPT, at the time of its creation it was viewed in far less alarming terms (though the United States did initially oppose its creation as unnecessary).
As you doubtless feel overwhelmed by many of the acronyms I have put before you, let me entertain you by recounting how, when the United Nations Fund for Economic Development was set up, the word Special was desperately added to it so that. instead of UNFED, it would turn into SUNFED, suggesting the tropical luxuriance of SUNKIST oranges if not of the equatorial forests! I would argue then that a broad, if necessarily fragile. consensus on the international economic management structure, or what we might call the superstructure defining the '*governance of the world economy," did obtain through the 1950s and 1960s. Alongside this consensus was also a certain tolerance of differing political preferences of individual countries and for basic differences in the economic policy mix that these countries might choose. Thus, while the World Bank did. under Eugene Black's Presidency. indulge in sentiments against lending to public sector projects, this attitude was not long sustained.
Mao Tse-tung evidently did not mean it when he asked for a hundred flowers to bloom. But the diversity of politics and economics that was tolerated by the hegemonic United States and other major actors in the corridors of power during the 1950s and 1960s was a reality, in my judgement (though, as my radical friends will remind me, this tolerance often did not extend to those at the extreme left end of the political spectrum).
THE FIRST IDEOLOGICAL DIVIDE
The success of OPEC in the early 1970s shattered the prevailing consensus, ushering in the first of the two ideological upheavals that have afflicted North-South relations. There were three major ideological aspects to the OPEC model.
First, it suggested that unilateral action by developing countries, in concert, could redistribute income to them from the developed world. Compared to the voluntary, and in fact limited and declining redistribution through foreign aid, which depended on the altruism or enlightened self-interest of the North, such unilaterally extracted redistribution evidently had sex appeal. Besides, the numbers involved were truly colossal, giving redistribution a role equal to the traditional, growth-related, route to developmental objectives.
Second, unlike aid, such redistribution implied sovereignty in the use of the redistributed resources.
This aspect had evident appeal to developing countries seeking greater control over their political destinies. I should say that OPEC's success came at a time when economic aid had become increasingly tied to performance criteria.
While such strings are appropriate from an economic viewpoint, and are indeed inevitable when parliaments and congresses have to be convinced that aid is usefully spent, they have always created a diplomatic problem between donors and recipients. Indeed. by the early 1970s. the evolution of the performance criteria into detailed "conditionality" and monitoring by donors and by their occasional "aid consortia" had begun to cause considerable friction. The OPEC model cut through this difficulty: the earned redistribution of resources would be automatically free from conditionalities and strings.
Third. the route to success ri la OPEC was through control over primary resources, and through the exercise of the power that followed therefrom.
Both aspects had immediate ideological implications.
Control would lend legitimacy to attempts at nationalization and, more weakly, to regulation and direction of the multinationals that were often in the primary, extractive industries of the developing countries. Exercise of the power from such control implied cartelization and utilization of the resulting monopoly power, as with OPEC. The former violated the premise of freer multinational investments, the latter the premise of free tradeboth ideologically at the center of the LIE0 philosophy.
These perceptions were not simply intellectual; they had their counterpart in the international politics of North-South economic relations. They were thus to break the ideological, hegemonic consensus.
A significant number of developing countries would now have an ideological conception that put them in a confrontational posture with the developed countries. Also, the conflict would be militant. The perception of "commodity power" vis-ci-vi.7 the developed countries meant that the ideological differences could be translated into demands for negotiations on changes in the governance of the world economy. The LIE0 era of consensus and of resource transfer by entreaty and moral suasion would now be replaced by demands for a New International Economic Order, the celebrated NIEO in the South but the infamous NIEO in the North. These demands would be made with a rhetoric that was often passionate; and the Suslovs of the NIEO, trained doubtless at the seats of learning in the North, would provide the articulation and substance to the rhetoric.
An important facet of this ideological divide (which was to help precipitate the second. ensuing and opposite ideological era) was the use of the United Nations as the forum for making these demands. The negative attitudes toward the United Nations have carried over into increasingly assertive ideological postures at multilateral economic agencies such as UNCTAD. The role that UNCTAD played in focusing early on important issues, such as tariff-escalation that generates high effective or value-added protection against developing countries, has been ignored and the "politicization" of the agency has been singled out for condemnation. ' If the United Nations has been discounted thus, the specialized agencies that constitute the central pillars of the Bretton Woods edifice have emerged as the arenas where the United States prefers to act. Correspondingly, there have been strong urges, and serious attempts, to purge these agencies of liberal heresies and any perceived conflicts with the play of market forces.
At the IMF. for example, the Administration has opposed the use of the Extended Facility (EF) which was set up originally in 1974 to provide longer-term finance to facilitate "structural adjustment."
It also opposed, with not one member in support of this position, the granting of a substantial EF loan to India on the ideological ground that, despite the tragic experience of South America, India should first exploit private lending rather than turn to the IMF for such financing.
Again, on the Compensatory Financing Facility (CFF), the low-conditionality window at the IMF. the United States was primarily responsible for restricting its utility (since August 1979) by requiring that any borrowing in excess of 50% of the CFF quota could now occur only if the IMF were satisfied that the member country was cooperating with the IMF. By 1983, the conditions under which drawings could be made were changed towards virtually eliminating its softconditionality character." On the debt situation generally, the Administration at first took the "benign neglect" view, asserting that laissrz-firirr would suffice. When the urgency of the debt situation became evident, there was a rush to the IMF to provide the necessary surveillance and conditionalities and for its quotas to be increased.
The Congress. having been duly briefed earlier on the Administration's criticisms of EF, CFF and other liberal excesses of the IMF. was now in the position of being told that the IMF should be strengthened to become the spearhead of the Administration's efforts to manage the debt crisis."' Until recently, the treatment of the World Bank was consistent with the ideological aspirations I have just detailed. The United States has been a principal advocate of extensive marketoriented conditionality on the Structural Adjustment Loans, the program of the Bank that is fraternal to the EF program of the IMF across the street (leading to inevitable jurisdictional tensions so that there is now an East-Bank-WestBank problem on the Potomac as well and selectively channelled to countries of strategic value to the United States. The principal beneficiaries of the bilateral US aid program are no longer the poor nations, who are thus caught in the squeeze between multilateral efforts (such as the IDA) that are threatened by US opposition and a vastly diminished bilateral assistance. President Reagan is reputed to have admonished the developing countries at the Cancun Summit that development is a difficult business; evidently, his Administration's aid policies seem to be directed at ensuring that it remains that way! The impatience with multilateralism and the desire to forge ahead with whomever will come on board is also manifest in some of the trade moves made by the Administration. The embrace of the European-style preferentiagrouping approach. as in the recent initiative for the Free Trade Area with Israel. the Caribbean Basin Initiative grant of discriminatorv prcfcrences, the bilateral deals on scrvicex with Israel and Canada. indicate a willingness to cornprornise the spirit of multilater~ilisni.
Some of these moves reflect a reaction to domestic protectionist pressures:
others are responses to lobbies actively seeking markets abroad. But the overall polit&l thrust towards bilateral moves is indeed laced by the militancy that is characteristic of the Administration:
if other GATT members want to move slowly. we will bypass them and pursue our trade objectives with anyone who comes along with us. Since US impatience is combined with a desire to extend GATT to a set of rules to facilitate private foreign investments, the militancy also has an ideological cutting edge. The ideological asscrtivcness that animates these new directions in US policv towards multilateralism and international insfitutions is also manifest in the Administration's postures and actions clscwhere which show, unabashed support of 1narket approaches.
Thus. the Administration withdrew support from the carefully negotiated Law of the Sea Treaty because of its "statist" provisions concerning an international seabed authority and its powers.
Again. it was the only nation that refused to sign the international convention that was adopted at the United Nations on guidelines for marketing baby food formula ~ a response to the tragic consequences caused by transplantation of developed-country marketing practices to the very different conditions in the developing countries.
At the 1984 Mexico Conference on population, the Administration insisted on the absurd doctrine that population growth would necessarily be benign in that it would automatically generate the income required to maintain itself. I call this a doctrinal shift from the hand-to-mouth theory of population in the poor countries to the hand-and-mouth theory! Again, it was a celebration of the doctrine that lrrissez-fbirc is ideal: it would produce not merely babies, but also the formula. pampers and cribs to take care of them. And the Earth had room for all! The other nations at the Conference were baffled by these assertions.
They laughed in the corridors. But still they went along in the conference halls. yielding to the United States what it seemed to want so badly.
Indeed. the Administration succeeded in these ideological moves well beyond what one might have been led to believe by those who talk and write of the loss of US dominance and the rise of ;I multipolar power configuration in its place. I believe that the reason is that the US has temporarily reverted to its dominant position in the world economy.
The Kc~ig;in"mics-induced world recession smiultaneously broke OPEC power and reduced the Third World, especially the important debt-carrying countries. to a relatively impotent status. Wcstcrn Europe has also been plagued by high levels of uncmploymcnt and a revival of stagnationist.
defeatist doctrines. Japan is economically strong but heavily coinstrained by the growing xenophobia that its success has fed almost evcrywherc. Prudential acceptance of US positions. particularly when passionately held and of no direct consequence to one's strategic interests (a condition not met by the Soviet gas pipclinc episode where the Europeans stood up to US pressures).
has thus been the rule.
TIIE BAKER PLAN: AN IDEOLOGICAL QUICKSTEP
The only silver lining to this black cloud. casting its shadow over North-South relations, has been provided by the dramatic shift in US policy towards the debt crisis. Mr Baker, the new Secretary of the Treasury, has faced up to the obvious folly of the policy of "malign neglect" of the international economy. by beginning to pull us back from the abyss that failure to intervene and to attempt coordination of economic policies among the major OECD countries impliede.g. via high interest rates and the overvaluation of the dollar. Equally, his initiative at the Seoul meeting of the IMF and the World Bank in October 1985, to shift the debt strategy from its deflationist, IMF-centered, hard-line approach to the World-Bank-centered soft-line approach has shown pragmatism and greater awareness of the needs of the debt-ridden countries, and a recognition that the hard-line policies were simply unworkable, counterproductive and imperiling the world economy as many had warned to no avail."
But it is interesting that, even as Mr Baker has turned the first-term policies around on this question, the market ideology remains strongly in place. indeed even more explicitly so than to date. For. the added funds that Mr Baker seeks to galvanize and channel via the World Bank and other programs to the indebted countries, inadequate as they still are to the necessities.12 are explicitly to be made conditional on domestic measures to encourage the market forces, both domestic and the private foreign investments. Hence, the widely-acclaimed shift to pragmatism is still cloaked in the ideological cloth that distinguished the rise of President Reagan. In fact, from a broader perspective, the Baker Plan itself can be construed as a creature of ideology -as a minimalist shift of the first-term strategy on debts required by the overheating of the debt crisis. It is worth noting that the Baker Plan surfaced when President Garcia of Peru had already acted with bravado and alacrity and President de la Madrid of Mexico was dropping alarming hints that, in the absence of net inflows such as those that the Baker Plan aims to generate, his acceptance of the hard-line conditionalities had been meaningless and that Mexico might opt for more radical solutions to the debt problem.
The transition from the IMFcentered strategy still rejects the radical "nonmarket" solutions to the debt-overhang problem offered by many such as Professors Albert Fishlow and Peter Kenen and the New York financier Felix Rohatyn. In fact, the new strategy represents a continuation of the market-oriented war on the debt problem by other means.
The ideological orientation of the Baker Plan is thus evident both in its origin and in the conditionalities it carries. It is thus a brilliant, ideological quick-step.
President Reagan and his team have indeed responded to pragmatic reaity. But they continue to fine-tune as they do so, yielding no more than they think they can get away with on the ideological front. The next turn of the screw, as the debt crisis hits the headlines again, should tell how far the Reagan Administration is prepared to go as its ideology confronts yet more disquieting realities. Professor Albert Fishlow has noted that the most
